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Analysing Terrorism from a Systems !inking Perspective
by Lukas Schoenenberger, Andrea Schenker-Wicki and Mathias Beck
Abstract
Given the complexity of terrorism, solutions based on single factors are destined to fail. Systems thinking o"ers 
various tools for helping researchers and policy makers comprehend terrorism in its entirety. We have developed 
a semi-quantitative systems thinking approach for characterising relationships between variables critical to 
terrorism and their impact on the system as a whole. For a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
terrorism, we present a 16-variable model characterising the critical components of terrorism and perform a 
series of highly focused analyses. We show how to determine which variables are best suited for government 
intervention, describing in detail their e"ects on the key variable—the political in%uence of a terrorist network. 
We also o"er insights into how to elicit variables that destabilise and ultimately break down these networks. 
Because we clarify our novel approach with #ctional data, the primary importance of this paper lies in the new 
framework for reasoning that it provides.
Keywords: counter-terrorism, systems theory, methodology
Introduction
"e war against terrorism [1] (“war on terror”) has lasted for over 10 years, costing approximately 1,5 million 
lives in Iraq and tens of thousands of lives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, demonstrating the obvious need 
for alternative anti-terror measures. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] We argue that it is time to rethink counterterrorist 
measures and present an unconventional approach to understanding terrorism, by analysing it from a 
systems thinking perspective.
Maani and Cavana [7] de$ne systems thinking as “a scienti$c $eld of knowledge for understanding change 
and complexity through the study of dynamic cause and e%ect over time.” Systems thinking is a method of 
capturing complex issues in a holistic way. Its focus lies on the interrelations of crucial variables in a given 
framework. "is approach substantially facilitates the understanding of the behavior of complex systems, 
enabling us to make predictions about any system’s evolution and to propose potential measures for changing 
the system’s dynamics. Only one study thus far has connected terrorism with systems thinking modeling: 
Grynkewich [8] models the $nancial subsystem of the Sala$st Group for Preaching and Combat. He focuses 
primarily on only one element of terrorism, fundraising. In contrast, we build a generic model that includes 
16 key variables of terrorism.
We have combined and further developed the ideas of Vester [9], Gomez and Probst [10], and Huerlimann 
[11] to conceptualise our systems thinking approach. [12] In this study, we show the enormous potential 
of such an approach by applying it to terrorism. We illustrate this method with a model that combines 
di%erent key aspects of terrorism. "e idea for our model is derived from !e Art of Interconnected !inking, 
a 2007 book by Frederic Vester, originally a German professor of biochemistry and a member of the Club of 
Rome. Vester studied the control and regulation mechanisms in living cells, especially the causes of cancer. 
Following his academic career, he developed a unique approach to systems thinking, one that he called 
“interconnected thinking,” and adapted the biological model to the political sphere, including an analysis of 
terrorism. He called that model “terror prevention” and published the $rst results of his analysis just a few 
17 February 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 1
days a&er September 11, 2001. Following that, Vester proposed to develop the model further in collaboration 
with the Technical Support Working Group of the U.S. Department of Defense. [13]
While using many of the same variables that Vester uses, we have adapted his model for our speci$c analysis. 
In contrast to the focus of Vester’s model on the U.S. response to terrorism in the post-September 11, 2001 
era, we build a more generic model that is not attached to a speci$c cultural context. In particular, we 
reduce the set of variables from 20 to 16 to enhance the structural clarity of the model [14]. Our modeling 
procedures are otherwise similar to the pioneering work of Vester on which they are based. Because we 
clarify our approach using $ctional data, the relevance of our work lies in the analytical framework that it 
provides, not in any speci$c recommendations for policy makers.
We argue that one particular variable—the political in#uence that a terrorist network can garner—is the key 
variable, i.e., the most important goal for any terrorist network. A&er demonstrating the criticality of this key 
variable, we then ask and answer corollary questions:
• What other variables—in addition to the political in#uence of a terrorist network—have a substantial   
impact on our model and therefore represent possible intervention points for governments?
•  What e%ects do these variables have on the key variable that we have identi$ed?
Finally, we tackle the issue of how governments can destabilise terrorist networks:
• Which bundles of variables must governments eliminate or defuse if they are to undermine a terrorist 
network e'ciently?
With the aid of simple algorithms, we can model the dynamics of a terrorist network. We argue that an 
intervention variable must be highly interlinked and should quickly disseminate changes throughout 
the system. Applied to our model are three variables suited for government intervention: “control of 
overreaction,” “e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures,” and “anti-terror support by moderate forces.” We have 
identi$ed these variables a&er a series of highly focused analyses. "e variable “control of overreaction” 
means that a country is capable of reacting proportionately to a terrorist attack. "e danger always exists that 
governments make highly emotional decisions in such situations and tend to overreact. O&en retaliation 
measures are disproportionally severe, hurting not only the terrorist network itself but also civilians, 
aggravating problems related to terrorism, and leading to a substantial boost in the recruitment of new 
terrorists. [15] [16] "e second variable, “e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures,” is of crucial importance for 
the careful planning and executing of military operations. Retaliatory actions should strike the Achilles’ heel 
of the terrorist network and weaken it over the long term but with the fewest possible civilian casualties. 
"e third variable appropriate for intervention is “anti-terror support by moderate forces.” Moderate forces 
are population groups (within a hostile country, area, or organisation) that are opposed to terrorism. "ese 
groups are important allies in countries with active terrorist networks. [17] [18] 
We describe in detail the impacts of “e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures” and “anti-terror support by 
moderate forces” on our key variable—the political in#uence of a terrorist network. Of the two, “e%ectiveness 
of anti-terror measures” is the most successful variable in reducing the political in#uence of a terrorist 
network in our model. In the $nal section, we analyse the stability of our model by removing single and 
multiple variables. To completely defuse our model, we must remove $ve variables: “recruitment of potential 
terrorists,” “impact of attacks,” “media reports,” “$nancial and material resources,” and “negative perception 
of industrial countries.”
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Systems !inking
A systems thinking approach [19] di%ers substantially from traditional reductionist approaches, which 
continuously divide the subject of interest into further specialised disciplines and focus on a small number 
of linear causal relationships between phenomena, explaining them in terms of their smallest identi$able 
parts (e.g., classical mechanics, cell biology, and axiomatic set theory). However, these traditional approaches 
o&en lead to incorrect results and create inappropriate incentives in conjunction with complex systems 
(e.g., problems related to a company). [20] In contrast, systems thinking concentrates on how a subject of 
interest interacts with other variables. Rather than breaking a system down into smaller components, systems 
thinking expands the view of a user, taking into account increasingly greater numbers of interactions. 
Systems thinking implies that the variables of a system have to be considered in a dynamic way and requires 
thinking in terms of processes. Systems thinking focuses, on the one hand, on the interactions between 
the di%erent variables in a certain system and, on the other hand, on the interactions between the di%erent 
variables and the system as a whole. Feedback processes are very important. "ose processes can be either 
direct or indirect and can dramatically in#uence the behaviour of a system.
To use systems thinking, we establish a model of the most important stakeholders, their objectives, and their 
relationships. In general, the relationship between two variables can be either positive or negative. A positive 
relationship means that an increase in variable A leads to an increase in variable B; conversely, a negative 
one implies that an increase in variable A leads to a decrease in variable B. To perform our analysis, we must 
specify the type of relationship between two variables, the strength of their interaction, and the time required 
for one variable to in#uence another.
"e systems thinking approach detailed in this article lacks the possibility of validation: the goodness or 
suitability of our results cannot be tested before they are actually implemented. "is is a clear limitation 
compared to more quantitative methods like system dynamics, where simulation allows for the optimisation 
and veri$cation of results. However, quantitative analysis methods require a great deal of data, which is very 
di'cult to collect and severely limited in terrorism research. For this reason, our methodology is at the 
moment the best available option for researchers examining terrorism.
Modeling Terrorism
As previously stated, our 16-variable model is based on the one established by Frederic Vester. We have 
adapted his model (see Figure 1) to better $t developments in terrorism research over the past decade. 
Vester, a pioneer in systems thinking, was able to graphically depict the impact of the post-September 11, 
2001, countermeasures taken by the U.S. government. In his preliminary conclusions—based on the model’s 
dynamics—he emphasised that pursuing the head of a terrorist network has only a very small impact on that 
network and does not destabilise it.
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Figure 1. !e 16-Variable Model
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Building on Vester’s model, we shi& the focus to the international community, encompassing many states 
that could be a%ected by terrorism instead of assuming that the U.S. is the only potential victim of terrorist 
attacks. Our reason is that, since September 11, 2001, major terrorist attacks have taken place outside the 
U.S., such as in Bali (2002) and in London (2005). [21] [22] While the attacks in Bali and London claimed 
fewer lives than the September 11, 2001, attacks, they nevertheless had disastrous consequences. Al-Qaeda 
played an important role in both attacks: "e London attack was carried out by a group with the same 
ideology as Al-Qaeda’s, [23] and the Indonesian terror branch “Jeemah Islamiah” was responsible for the Bali 
attack. [24] "e model in Figure 1 presents the activities of a large, internationally active terrorist network 
such as Al-Qaeda. 
Our model comprises 16 in#uencing variables containing all stakeholders involved in terror activities, i.e., 
stakeholders identi$ed as aggressors, victims, or governments. "e interconnections between the variables 
can be either positive (solid blue lines) or negative (dotted red lines). "e model shows both the impacts 
of terrorist attacks and the impacts of countermeasures taken by governments. Our model is admittedly 
simpli$ed but powerful enough to represent basic processes in a terrorist network. 
!e Variables in the Model
Table 1 presents the 16 variables in our model with a brief description of each. 
Table 1: All Variables used in Model
(1) Political in#uence of a terrorist network A terrorist network’s attempt to increase or at least to stabilise its 
political in#uence [25] [26]
(2) Recruitment of potential terrorists People’s willingness to join a terrorist network, and, in extreme 
cases, even to sacri$ce their lives as in the case of suicide bombers 
[27]
(3) Density of a terrorist network "e number of terrorists per area (region/country) [28] [29]
(4) Negative perception of industrial 
countries
"e level of denial and bitterness re Western standards and 
ideologies [30]
(5) Quality of life in emerging or 
developing countries
Factors such as political rights, freedom, education, GDP per 
capita, safety
(6) Security measures All government measures for protecting the civil population from 
a terrorist attack
(7) Control of overreaction Governments’ ability to avoid disproportionately severe reactions 
immediately following a terrorist attack.
(8) Media reports Press releases covering terrorism
(9) Intragroup communication and 
coordination
Collaboration and knowledge exchange among terrorists in a 
network
(10) Support by sympathisers Level of local support for the terrorist network, necessary to 
purchase resources. [31]
(11) Impact of attacks "ree factors for attack magnitude: symbolism of the attack, 
number of people injured or killed, and economic damage [32] 
[33] [34]
(12) Return to normal life "e population’s process of returning to “ordinary business” a&er 
a terrorist attack [35]
(13) Financial and material resources Financial and material in#ows into the terrorist network [36] [37] 
[38] [39] 
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(14) E%ectiveness of anti-terror measures Magnitude of both civilian casualties and damage to the terrorist 
network 
(15) Anti-terror support by moderate forces Level of support by moderate forces: anti-terror population 
groups in a hostile country, area, or organisation
(16) International anti-terror support and 
coordination
International anti-terror support and all anti-terror measures 
taken by allied governments, institutions, and organisations 
Analysis of the Model
We build a model to illustrate how the di%erent variables are linked. We want to know in which direction 
one variable in#uences another and whether this in#uence happens immediately or with delay. To quantify 
impact and time delay, we use two matrices: a cross-impact matrix and a cross-time matrix. "e data within 
the matrices are solely for illustrative purposes, and do not represent validated data for one obvious reason: 
detailed data on terrorist networks is closely guarded (i.e., classi$ed) government information and certainly 
not available to researchers restricted to the use of open sources. "erefore, we use illustrative details to 
show the usefulness of our model. "e goal of this section is to present a new method as to how security 
experts and policy makers could approach terrorism. [40]
 Impact of the Di"erent Variables
To describe the in#uence of each variable, we use a cross-impact matrix. In contrast to Gomes and Probst 
[41] or Vester [42], we value only direct relationships. To indicate the strength of the relationships between 
the variables in our model, we use the following code:
Table 2: Codes for Describing the Impact
-1                        Ù                     inversely proportional
Variable B reacts inversely proportionally in reference to a shi$ in variable A.
0 (empty) Ù  no in"uence
No direct link exists between variables A and B
+1   Ù  proportional
Variable B reacts proportionally to a shi$ in variable A.
Consequently, we evaluate each link between two variables as either +1 or -1. Although we could also 
expand the range of code with “disproportionately” low (2/3) and high (3/2) impact values, for illustrative 
reasons we choose in this paper to use proportional and inversely proportional e%ects.   
Volume 8, Issue 1PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM
February 201422
Table 3: Cross-impact Matrix
Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 AS
1 Political in"uence of a terrorist network   1   1       1   1     1       5
2 Recruitment of potential terrorists 1   1               1           3
3 Density of a terrorist network 1               1         1     3
4 Negative perception of industrial countries   1                         -1   2
5
Quality of life in emerging or developing 
countries   -1   -1                         2
6
Security measures -1 -1 -1 3
7
Control of overreaction -1 1 1 1 4
8 Media reports 1           -1                   2
9 Intragroup communication & coordination 1 1                 1           3
10 Support by sympathisers   1                     1       2
11 Impact of attacks 1         1 -1 1       -1   -1   1 7
12 Return to normal life             1                   1
13 Financial and material resources 1 1                 1           3
14 E#ectiveness of anti-terror measures -1 -1 -1 -1                     1   5
15 Anti-terror support by moderate forces -1 -1               -1     -1       4
16
International anti-terror support & 
coordination             1                   1
PS 8 8 3 4 1 1 4 2 1 2 4 2 3 3 3 1
  Degree of cross-linking (AS + PS) 13 11 6 6 3 4 8 4 4 4 11 3 6 8 7 2  
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"e active sum (AS in the last column on the right), is the sum of all of the direct in#uences (outgoing 
#ows) that can be attributed to a certain variable, i.e., the sum of the values in the row of a single variable. 
"e active sum thus indicates how strongly this variable a%ects or dominates the system, with a high active 
sum indicating great in#uence. "e passive sum (PS second to last column) is the sum of all of the incoming 
#ows and indicates how strongly the system a%ects or dominates a variable. To calculate the incoming and 
outgoing #ows, one can take only the absolute values into account. 
"e degree of cross-linking depicts how strongly the di%erent in#uencing factors are interconnected. A higher 
number indicates that a variable is more essential for the survival of the system. "us the removal of a highly 
interlinked element from the system may lead to the system’s partial or complete collapse. 
In our model, we are mostly interested in the dynamic evolution of the “political in#uence of a terrorist 
network.” "is variable, which shows the highest degree of cross-linking (13), is crucially important. In 
addition, this variable has more ingoing than outgoing links, meaning that as an in#uencing factor it is very 
sensitive to changes in our model. "e variables “recruitment of potential terrorists” and “impact of attacks” 
are also of particular signi$cance. While both have a high degree of cross-linking, they di%er in the ratio of 
the active sum to the passive sum (i.e., as “impact of attacks” has the highest active sum, the entire model is 
sensitive to any change in this speci$c variable). 
"ese $ndings of the cross-impact matrix are not surprising. To maintain a certain level of political 
in#uence, a terrorist network must rely on the continuous hiring of new manpower and must execute terror 
attacks that feature high symbolic value. "erefore, these variables occupy a central position in our model.
Time Delay
In systems thinking, time plays a major role. We want to know how a system or network develops over time. 
If we adjust one variable, the e%ect will not spread immediately through the system. "erefore, we must 
include delays in our model. To accommodate time in this setup, we construct a cross-time matrix (see 
Table 5). "e procedure is analogous to the construction of the cross-impact matrix. Again, for the sake of 
complexity and clarity, we take only direct links into account. "e matrix is compiled with the data in Table 
4.
Table 4: Codes for Indicating Time Delay
0 (empty) Ù  no in"uence
!ere is no direct link between variable A and B; consequently, no delays can occur
1  Ù  short-term (< 1 year)
If variable B reacts with a short time delay to a change in variable A
2  Ù  middle-term (1-3 years)
If variable B reacts with a moderate time delay to a change in variable A 
4  Ù  long-term (> 3 years)
If variable B reacts with a long time delay to a change in variable A
To avoid bias, we must associate the time categories with real numbers and code the categories 
proportionally. Depending on the system, the time categories can refer to di%erent times.
Volume 8, Issue 1PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM
February 201424
 Table 5: Cross-time matrix
Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 PD
1 Political in"uence of a terrorist network   2   4       1   1     2       2.0
2 Recruitment of potential terrorists 2   1               2           1.7
3 Density of a terrorist network 2               1         2     1.7
4 Negative perception of industrial countries   4                         1   2.5
5 Quality of life in emerging or developing c.   4   4                         4.0
6 Security measures     1               1 1         1.0
7 Control of overreaction       1 1                 1 2   1.3
8 Media reports 1           1                   1.0
9 Intragroup communication & coordination 2 2                 2           2.0
10 Support by sympathisers   1                     2       1.5
11 Impact of attacks 1         1 1 1       1   1   1 1.0
12 Return to normal life             1                   1.0
13 Financial and material resources 2 2                 2           2.0
14 E#ectiveness of anti-terror measures 1 1 1 1                     1   1.0
15 Anti-terror support by moderate forces 4 2               4     4       3.5
16 International anti-terror support & coord.             2                   2.0
  RD 1.9 2.3 1.0 2.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.8 1.0 2.7 1.3 1.3 1.0  
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In Table 5, produced delay (PD - last column on the right) and received delay (bottom row) show the mean 
values of every row (produced delay) and column (received delay). 
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of produced and received delay with respect to a variable A. Produced 
delay is the average time an impulse needs to reach a subsequent node from variable A. "is is a measure of 
how much delay a variable causes in the entire system. 
Figure 2. Produced and Received Delay
In contrast, received delay indicates the average time required for an impulse to arrive at variable A from a 
preceding node. "erefore, received delay is a measure of the time required for variable A to react to changes 
in the system.
Figure 2. Produced and Received Delay
Intervention Variables
From a systems thinking perspective, determining which variables are suited for intervention is important. 
"ese variables must have a great impact on the entire system and act with little or no time delay. To identify 
such variables, we must combine the cross-impact and cross-time matrices. More precisely, we create a graph 
(see Figure 3) with the produced delay (time) on the x-axis and the active sum (impact) on the y-axis.
Figure 3. Best Intervention Variables
"e graph in Figure 3 is divided into four quadrants [43], each representing a speci$c cluster of variables 
with respect to impact and delay. An ideal intervention variable should have a dominant position in the 
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system and thus a high number of outgoing links (high active sum). In addition, an appropriate variable 
for intervention should quickly spread stimuli throughout the system (low produced delay). "erefore, the 
best intervention variables are found in the upper-le& quadrant, which is labeled with a Roman numeral 
two (II). Variables in the upper-right quadrant (I) can also be interesting for government interventions due 
to their high impact on the system. However, the e%ects of these variables on the system only unfold a&er a 
signi$cant time delay.
By de$nition an intervention variable must be one that policy makers can control. "is criterion excludes 
variables 11 (“impact of attacks”) in quadrant II and 1 (“political in#uence of a terrorist network”) in 
quadrant I from being ideal interventions, because individuals outside the terrorist network cannot in#uence 
these variables. Variables 14 (“e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures”) and 7 (“control of overreaction”) 
satisfy the criteria of being both ideal and controllable. In other words, for a government that actively $ghts 
terrorism, choosing the most e%ective anti-terror measures (causing minimal civilian casualties) to weaken 
the terrorist network is crucial. In addition “control of overreaction” is an essential variable in any terrorist 
network, because terrorists aim to provoke disproportionate and rash post-assault retaliations. "ese 
retaliations tend to facilitate the recruitment of new terrorists and damage the reputation of the retaliating 
country. "erefore, for government policy makers, the use of a control mechanism relative to premature and 
blind retaliation is very important. Variable 15 (“anti-terror support by moderate forces”) in quadrant I is 
another intervention option for decision makers. However although this variable has considerable impact on 
the entire model, it acts very slowly. 
Due to their small impact on the model the variables in the lower quadrants, III and IV, are essentially useless 
for policy maker.
Path Analysis
We now analyse the consequences of intensifying (i.e.,positively stimulating) the intervention variables 
that we have identi$ed. We are interested in measuring their e%ects on the most important variable: the 
political in#uence of a terrorist network (variable 1). To do so, we have to conduct path analyses. A “path” is 
a sequence of links connecting a starting variable to a target variable. [44] In complex networks such as our 
model, hundreds of paths potentially lie between two nodes. "e following questions are of particular value 
in this context:
• How many di%erent paths in our model exist from the intervention variable to the target variable 
(“political in#uence of the terrorist network”)?
• When do these paths arrive at the target variable (time delay)?
• What is their e%ect?
To calculate the di%erent paths and their corresponding e%ect and delay, we applied a path$nder algorithm. 
"e algorithm takes the initial variable and searches for all possible paths toward a target node. [45] Each 
path is unique, and a node can be crossed only once per path. 
Figure 4 displays the results of the $rst path analysis between the intervention variable “e%ectiveness of anti-
terror measures” (variable 14) and the target variable “political in#uence of a terrorist network” (variable 1).
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Figure 4. Frequency Distributions of all Paths between Variables 14 and 1
In total, 529 possible paths conjoin these two variables. Represented by dark, framed bars, the vast majority 
(416) of these paths have a negative impact on the political in#uence of a terrorist network. However, 113 
paths boost the political in#uence of a terrorist network (bright, unframed bars). "ese results con$rm the 
obvious: the better the e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures by a retaliating country, the less the political 
in#uence of a terrorist network. 
We propose that the ratio between the total number of negative and positive paths is a reasonable measure for 
comparing di%erent intervention variables and for determining which is the most e%ective in reducing the 
political in#uence of a terrorist network. For variable 14 (“e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures”), this means:
Total number of negative paths / total number of positive paths = 416 / 113 = 3.68
Now we examine more closely the two distributions (dark and bright) that Figure 4 depicts. Although 
the delay values on the x-axis have no explanatory power per se, in relation to other distributions we can 
nonetheless make a statement using these values: "e frequency distribution resulting from the negative 
paths is negatively skewed. In comparison with a Gaussian distribution, the le& tail is longer, and the 
mass center is located on the right side. "e extended le& tail implies that improving the e%ectiveness of 
anti-terror measures will have a substantial and immediate negative e%ect on the political in#uence of a 
terrorist network. However, due to the asymmetry of this distribution, the median lies slightly to the right. 
Consequently, it takes a long time for the full e%ect to be measurable in the target variable. "e frequency 
distribution resulting from the positive paths will never be detectable and is completely overlapped by the 
other distribution. 
For comparison, we now show the results of a second path analysis between intervention variable 15, “anti-
terror support by moderate forces,” and variable 1, “the political in#uence of a terrorist network” (see $gure 
5).
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Figure 5. Frequency Distributions of all Paths between Variables 15 and 1
Between these two variables, we have 399 paths in total. "e ratio between the total number of negative and 
positive paths is 3.16. "erefore, “anti-terror support by moderate forces” has a considerable negative impact 
on the political in#uence of a terrorist network, but it is certainly less striking than intervention variable 14. 
"e dark frequency distribution is approximately bell-shaped, meaning that the tail regions are thin and that 
the mass is concentrated around the mean. "erefore, little or no negative e%ect is detectable within a short 
period. In contrast to variable 14, “e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures,” it takes less time for variable 15 to 
have its full e%ect on the target variable. Remarkably, the medians of the two distributions di%er signi$cantly. 
In Figure 5, when the dark distribution is peaking, the other is still rising. Consequently, we measure only 
little or no negative impact on the political in#uence of a terrorist network in the long run, because an 
increasing number of paths are aiding the terrorist network.
Model Stability
In this section we analyse the structure of our 16-variable model in more detail. In particular, we look at 
feedback cycles that play a crucial role for model stability. In systems, feedback loops are structural elements 
that mostly determine their stability. [46] Feedback cycles are closed loops starting and ending at the same 
node. "is structure implies that a change in an involved variable a%ects not only subsequent elements but 
also the changing variable itself. 
Feedback loops are generally classi$ed into two categories: “reinforcing” or “positive” feedback cycles and 
“balancing” or “negative” feedback cycles. [47] Figure 6 illustrates the di%erence between these two di%erent 
feedback systems.
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Figure 6. Reinforcing and Balancing Feedback Loops
Reinforcing feedback cycles are destabilising factors in a system. Each variable involved is either growing or 
declining over time. In short, positive feedback loops boost or amplify whatever is occurring in the system. 
In contrast to reinforcing cycles, balancing feedback loops equilibrate the system. If variable A is stimulated 
positively, the impulse will change polarity during the loop and have a negative impact on variable A. 
"erefore, negative feedback cycles are self-correcting and contribute to stability. [48]
Figure 7 depicts the four primary positive feedback cycles that increase the political in#uence of a terrorist 
network. For better visualisation, we add two additional links between the variable pairs 1/10 and 1/11.
Figure 7. Central Reinforcing Feedback Loops
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"ere is one small feedback cycle, including variable 8, “media reports,” and variable 1, “the political 
in#uence of a terrorist network.” "e remaining feedback loops are bigger, each containing four variables. 
Importantly, three variables (“recruitment of potential terrorists,” “support by sympathisers,” and “impact of 
attacks”) participate in two feedback cycles at a time.   
To better explain the model’s structure, we apply a search algorithm on feedback cycles. [49] "e following 
issues are important in this context:
• How many di%erent feedback loops appear in our model?
• What is the ratio between reinforcing and balancing feedback loops?
• What are the consequences relative to model stability if single or multiple variables are removed?
"e third point is of special value for policy makers. "ey need to know which variables or combination of 
variables they must focus on to break down any terrorist networks. Table 6 summarises the results of this 
particular analysis. "e second row of Table 6 refers to the whole 16-variable model in Figure 1, showing 
the results if no variable were removed from the model. "e entire model contains 2,450 feedback loops 
indicating a highly interconnected and complex network. A majority of these loops are reinforcing (1,824) 
and a smaller fraction are balancing (626). "e smallest loop is composed of two nodes (min. path), whereas 
the biggest loop includes 13 nodes (max. path). 
"e last column in Table 6 shows the ratio between the total number of negative and positive paths incoming 
on variable 1, “political in#uence of a terrorist network.” We use again a path$nder algorithm to count all 
possible paths connecting any node in the model with the target node—variable 1. As long as this value lies 
below 1, a net positive e%ect exists on the political in#uence of a terrorist network. For our entire model, this 
value is 0.81; there are more positive paths leading to variable 1 than negative paths, so the political in#uence 
of the terrorist network is generally strengthened by the variables in our model. 
From the third row onwards, Table 6 shows the results if we start removing variables from our model. First 
we extract single variables, then bundles of variables to study the consequences of those removals for the 
number and composition of reinforcing and balancing feedback loops. "e ultimate goal of this analysis 
is to $nd a combination of variables that, if removed from the model, causes the number of reinforcing 
feedback loops to drop to zero. "is $nding will reveal the particular combination of variables that, if they are 
addressed or di%used by a government, would e'ciently $ght the processes that boost the political in#uence 
of a terrorist network.
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  Table 6: Policy on/o# Analysis 
removed variable(s) # feedbacks # reinforcing (+) # balancing (-) min. path max. path # remaining feedbacks (in %) ratio ingoing paths on 1
Intact network 2450 1824 626 2 13 100.00% 0.81
1 405 297 108 2 12 16.53% - 
2 296 232 64 2 12 12.08% 0.76
3 859 730 129 2 11 35.06% 0.68
4 937 707 230 2 12 38.24% 0.79
5 1911 1465 446 2 13 78.00% 0.69
6 1910 1430 480 2 13 77.96% 0.87
7 376 290 86 2 10 15.35% 0.73
8 1649 1179 470 2 13 67.31% 0.88
9 1560 1121 439 2 13 63.67% 0.85
10 1253 938 315 2 12 51.14% 0.85
11 192 128 64 2 11 7.84% 1.1
12 1798 1238 560 2 13 73.39% 0.9
13 694 545 149 2 12 28.33% 0.87
14 954 732 222 2 13 38.94% 0.64
15 568 434 134 2 12 23.18% 0.61
16 2124 1791 333 2 13 86.69% 0.68
8;10;13 267 199 68 2 11 10.90% 1
10;11;13 72 51 21 2 9 2.94% 1.08
4;10;11 49 35 14 2 9 2.00% 1.12
2;11;3 22 22 0 2 8 0.90% 1
2;10;11 18 17 1 2 7 0.73% 1.04
2;4;11 13 12 1 2 7 0.53% 1.05
2;11;13 11 10 1 2 6 0.45% 1.06
2;11;8 6 5 1 2 5 0.24% 2.05
2;11;8;13;4 1 0 1 2 2 0.041% 2.4
32 February 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 1
To e%ectively reduce the political in#uence of a terrorist network, one must break the central reinforcing 
feedback loops displayed in Figure 7. Variable 11 (“impact of attacks”), which is part of two positive feedback 
loops, has the greatest e%ect on model stability. If this variable is removed from the model, the total number 
of feedback loops will decrease by approximately 92%. "is $nding is not at all surprising, because each 
terrorist network plans and executes attacks to cause the most severe physical and psychological damage. 
"erefore, it is of great importance for every country threatened by terrorism to protect potential targets in 
the best possible way: by protecting particular buildings and places that have great historic value and those 
that attract many people. Another key variable is the “recruitment of potential terrorists,” the fuel in the 
terrorist network. Stopping recruitment would cause the total number of feedback loops to drop by roughly 
88%. However, reducing or even stopping the in#ow of new terrorists is a complex task, requiring both a 
large amount of time and resources and a deep understanding of the underlying motives that lead young 
people to join a terrorist network. O&en, a lack of future prospects in poor and underdeveloped countries 
provides the breeding ground for joining a terrorist organisation.
However, the separate removal of variables 11 (“impact of attacks”) and 2 (“recruitment of potential 
terrorists”) does not lead to a complete crush of our model—both interventions reduce the number of 
feedbacks signi$cantly but there remain hundreds of positive feedbacks in the model. "is means that to 
perfectly break the model, we need to eliminate or defuse several variables until no single positive feedback 
loop—one that reinforces the political in#uence of a terrorist network—remains in the model. Already, 
Vester [8] has suggested that a complete dissolution of a terrorist network is only possible by simultaneously 
tackling multiple variables of these networks.
We achieve the best results by removing variables 2, 11, 8, 13, and 4 (“recruitment of potential terrorist,” 
“impact of attacks,” “media reports,” “$nancial and material resources,” and “negative perception of industrial 
countries”). E%ectively targeting these variables completely crushes our model, leaving only one negative 
feedback loop remaining. Media reports play a crucial role in the context of terrorism. Attacks that generate 
a large amount of media reportage help to strengthen the political in#uence of a terrorist network. "erefore, 
the press should strike the right balance between informing and over-informing the public about terror 
attacks. Obviously terrorists are dependent on $nancial and material resources (variable 13). Experts have 
estimated Al-Qaeda’s budget for 2001-2004 at 20-50 million dollars, meaning that Al-Qaeda was at that time 
incredibly well funded. [32] Governments combating terrorism should try to identify the sources of these 
funds and cap them. In the end, countries threatened by terrorism should also ask themselves why they 
are so negatively perceived in those countries where the terrorists originate from (variable 4). Tackling this 
combination of variables also has a strong positive e%ect on the ratio between the total number of negative 
and positive paths leading to variable 1, as displayed in the last column in Table 6. "is ratio rises to 2.4, 
implying that 2.4 times more negative paths exist than positive ones. In short, eliminating the combination 
of variables discovered by our analysis reduces the political in#uence of a terrorist network systematically for 
this particular network.
Conclusion
"is article presents a new method for dealing with terrorism. As terrorism is a complex problem, simple 
solutions focusing on only one factor are destined to fail. Given that we must understand terrorism in its 
entirety, systems thinking o%ers tools for reaching this goal. "e key to success thus lies in the modeling 
process. To accurately produce reliable outcomes, a model must re#ect the most relevant in#uencing factors 
and their interdependencies. Our model does precisely that. [50]
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Once a well-grounded model is available, policy makers can perform di%erent analyses from the $eld of 
systems thinking. First, however, they must characterise each relationship and answer the following two 
questions: How strongly does one variable in#uence another? How long does it take for this e%ect to be 
measurable?
A graph in which time and e%ect are mirrored enables the deduction of the best intervention variables in 
the system. By de$nition, an intervention variable has a dominant position (high active sum) and quickly 
distributes stimuli throughout the system (low produced delay). In our model, we found three variables 
suitable for intervention: (1) control of overreaction, (2) e%ectiveness of anti-terror measures, and (3) anti-
terror support by moderate forces.
Next, we studied in detail the e%ects of two intervention variables on the political in#uence of a terrorist 
network. Because more than one connecting path exists between the intervention and the target variable, we 
applied a path$nder algorithm to reveal all possible routes. One astonishing result is that both “e%ectiveness 
of anti-terror measures,” and “anti-terror support by moderate forces” show not only a dominant negative 
e%ect but also a small enhancing e%ect on the political in#uence of a terrorist network.
Finally, we tested the model’s stability by removing single and multiple variables. To completely break down 
our terror model, we must approach the problem in $ve di%erent areas: (1) recruitment of potential terrorist, 
(2) impact of attacks, (3) media reports, (4) $nancial and material resources, and (5) negative perception of 
industrial countries.
"e methodology presented in this article addresses two important weaknesses of multidimensional analysis 
methods in the terrorism research literature [51]: First, our approach explicitly considers temporality as a 
crucial element in modeling terrorism, which has been neglected up to now. Second, by assigning positive 
and negative weights to all relationships in the model, we evade the problem of treating variables uniformly. 
"e range of weights can also be expanded to include “disproportionately” low (2/3) and high (3/2) impact 
values—adding more speci$city but also more complexity to the analysis process.   
"e model in Figure 1 is based on Vester’s work that combined key aspect of international terrorism 
threatening the United States at the beginning of this century. We have adapted his model by taking into 
account that terrorism matters for the whole international community rather than only the U.S., thus 
analysing “globalised” terrorism. Our model is not limited to that scale: it is easily adaptable to national or 
local forms of terrorism. "e 16 variables used in our model are highly aggregated and would be changed 
if the focus were to be a national terrorist network. In such a case, the modeling process starts with the 
identi$cation of all relevant stakeholders in the speci$c national terrorism context and with the deduction of 
new key variables representing stakeholder interests. 
"e one drawback of our method is its limited ability to employ validation tests. In contrast to simulation 
methods, our semi-quantitative systems thinking approach does not allow checking the validity of the results 
before they are actually implemented. Nonetheless, we strongly recommend that policy makers use our 
systems thinking tools to $nd long-term sustainable solutions for complex issues in business and society. [52] 
In addition, we emphasise that the method presented in this paper is an expert tool. A potential user needs to 
have extensive knowledge about the subject of analysis, otherwise no reliable outcome can be achieved. 
At this point we can describe feedback in a qualitative and descriptive manner. "erefore, future research 
should be directed towards a better formal understanding of feedback structures in a complex system. 
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